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Abstract
In ad hoc networks, devices have to cooperate in order to compensate for the absence of
infrastructure. Yet, autonomous devices tend to abstain from cooperation in order to save their
own resources. Incentive schemes have been proposed as a means of fostering cooperation under
these circumstances. In order to work eﬀectively, incentive schemes need to be carefully tailored
to the characteristics of the cooperation protocol they should support. This is a complex and
demanding task. However, up to now, engineers are given virtually no help in designing an
incentive scheme. Even worse, there exists no systematic investigation into which characteristics
should be taken into account and what they imply. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a
systematic approach for the engineering of incentive schemes. The suggested procedure comprises
the analysis and adjustment of the cooperation protocol, the choice of appropriate incentives for
cooperation, and guidelines for the evaluation of the incentive scheme. Finally, we show how the
proposed procedure is successfully applied to a service discovery overlay.
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1 Introduction
In ad hoc networks, devices have to cooperate in order to make up for the absence of infrastructure.
However, each participating device is under the control of its user and, thus, aims at maximizing
its utility. This means that devices will only cooperate if this is proﬁtable for them. Most often,
cooperation is not proﬁtable in itself. Therefore, distributed schemes have been proposed which
oﬀer incentives for cooperation, thereby making it attractive for devices to cooperate.
Such incentive schemes make use of incentive mechanisms in order to foster cooperation. An
example of an incentive mechanism is a distributed reputation system [1]. Yet, the choice and
conﬁguration of appropriate incentive mechanisms is highly non-trivial. This is partly due to
the dependency on the speciﬁcs of the application domain. Currently, there is no systematic
procedure that supports the developer of an incentive scheme by managing the complexity of his
task. As a result, the conception and evaluation of incentive schemes is still more approached as
an art than a engineering principle. This situation is especially harmful since each of the various
cooperation protocols of ad hoc networks demands for a speciﬁc incentive scheme that takes its
characteristics into account.
Our approach is to systematically engineer incentive schemes. In Section 3, we discuss the
state of the art for the development of incentive schemes. In Section 2, we take a closer look
at appropriate models of cooperation and at the scope of incentive schemes. This provides the
foundation for presenting and discussing a systematic procedure for engineering incentive schemes
in Section 4. We exemplify such engineering for the cooperation protocol Lanes in Section 5 and,
ﬁnally, conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Cooperation Models and Incentive Schemes
In this section, we give an overlook of the basic concepts that are required for the development of
incentive schemes. For this purpose, we take a closer look at cooperation models and point out
the necessity of incentive schemes.
Cooperation models. In our previous work [2, 3], we proposed a transaction-centric coopera-
tion model. It assumes that cooperation is composed of transactions among autonomous protocol
entities. Each entity may commit to participate in one or several transactions.
The transaction-centric model makes sense for the provision and consumption of application
services. However, it is diﬃcult to apply the transaction-centric model to cooperation in networks
and overlays. This stems from diﬃculties of capturing continuous cooperation among several
entities into the transaction-centric model. We conclude that a more generic cooperation model
is needed.
According to the commitment-centric cooperation model, an entity enters into a commitment
if it commits to exhibit certain behavior. An entity adheres to its commitment if it actually
exhibits the behavior it committed to. The transaction-centric model is a specialization of this
cooperation model since it conﬁnes commitments to single transactions. More speciﬁcally, par-
ticipating in a transaction means entering in a commitment, whereas adhering to a commitment
refers to refraining from defecting in the course of a transaction.
Incentive schemes. A rational entity, i.e., an entity that aims at maximizing its proﬁt, only
decides to enter into a commitment if it is beneﬁcial for the attainment of the own goals. In
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this context, the beneﬁts of entering into a commitment have to be assessed. The main problem
arises from the fact that such assessment also has to consider the likeliness of getting hold of
the beneﬁts. They accrue from the actions of the autonomous transaction partners who do not
necessarily adhere to their commitments. As a result, each entity is suspicious of the beneﬁts
that arise from entering into commitments and adhering to them.
The conventional solution to this problem is to make use of a central authority that is able
to enforce the adherence to commitments. However, such central authority represents an infras-
tructural component. Hence, it contradicts the paradigm of self-organization that is paramount
to ad hoc networks. Therefore, there is a need for a distributed scheme that provides incentives
for entering into commitments and adhering to them.
3 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the state of the art for the development of incentive schemes in ad hoc
networks. Furthermore, we discuss incentive engineering as an approach that is used in economics
for the conception of appropriate incentives.
Existing incentive schemes in ad hoc networks. In the absence of any systematic pro-
cedure for their development, the design of the existing incentive schemes [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] is
characterized by the ex ante choice (and conﬁguration) of incentive mechanisms [2]. For the de-
velopment of further incentive schemes, the usefulness of the existing incentive schemes is limited.
This stems from the following reasons:
• They are bound to speciﬁc cooperation protocols, often without making this explicit.
• Their conception is monolithic and, thus, hinders the reuse of their components.
• Their evaluation is not performed on the basis of comparable criteria.
This means that it is unlikely that a developer can simply reuse one of the existing schemes
in order to enhance cooperation in a given situation. On the other hand, he is given little if any
help in designing his own incentive scheme. Thus, despite the fact that incentive schemes need
to be tailored to the cooperation protocol used, little is known on how to achieve this tailoring.
Incentive engineering. In economics, incentive engineering [10] has been proposed as a means
of systematically developing incentive schemes. It assumes an incentive mechanism that is ar-
bitrarily quantiﬁable and provides full incentive compatibility. For example, the use of money
provides such an incentive mechanism. For each action of the cooperation protocol, the engineer
determines the quantiﬁcation of the incentive mechanism that yields a maximization of some
utility. This approach has been applied in [11] for the development of an incentive scheme on the
link layer.
However, incentive engineering is not suitable for the development of incentive schemes in ad
hoc networks. This stems from the following reasons:
• In our previous work [3], we have shown that, in ad hoc networks, it is impossible to
conceive an incentive mechanism that it is both arbitrarily quantiﬁable and fully incentive
compatible.
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• The exogenous determination of the quantiﬁcation is contradicted by the autonomy of the
devices. Consequently, the devices do not adhere to the developed scheme.
• In ad hoc networks, it might be reasonable to adjust the cooperation protocols in order to
facilitate the development of the incentive scheme. However, incentive engineering does not
make use of this means.
4 The Procedure for Engineering Incentive Schemes
The systematic design of incentive schemes comprises several steps. As a ﬁrst step, the engineer
analyzes and adjusts the cooperation protocol that requires an incentive scheme. Subsequently,
crucial design decisions have to be made regarding the choice of incentives and the means of
implementing them. Finally, the engineer evaluates the resulting cooperation protocol by applying
an appropriate evaluation method. In the following, we give an in-depth discussion of these steps.
The discussion remains rather abstract since it will be exempliﬁed by the case study of Section 5.
4.1 The Cooperation Protocol
Analysis. A thorough understanding of the cooperation protocol is required for the design of
an appropriate incentive scheme. Therefore, an analysis has to be conducted in order to answer
the following questions:
• (Q1) Which entities are considered? Existing incentive schemes [5, 9] are focussed on
network protocol entities. Yet, it might make sense to include protocol entities from diﬀerent
protocol layers [12].
• (Q2) Are the entities rational or tamper resistant? The incentive scheme does not consider
incentives for tamper resistant entities since they cannot exhibit autonomous behavior.
• (Q3) Do the entities have identities and is there a means of reliable authentication? If
entities are able to create new identities, some mechanisms of incentive schemes become
less eﬀective. In addition, most mechanisms cannot be applied if spooﬁng1 is possible.
• (Q4) How do the entities valuate the utility and the costs that arise from cooperation? The
answer to this question indicates which kind of misbehavior is to be expected from rational
entities.
• (Q5) How heterogeneous are the entities with regard to such valuation? Such heterogeneity
is to be expected for ad hoc networks since the capabilities of the participating devices
largely diﬀers. In case of such heterogeneity, entity-speciﬁc misbehavior is to be expected.
After the analysis of the entities that take part in the ad hoc network, the speciﬁcs of the
cooperation protocol have to be examined:
• (Q6) What kinds of inter-entity cooperation exist? The answer to this question is deter-
mined by the cooperation protocol that the entities run.
1Spoofing refers to the ability of assuming the identity of other entities.
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• (Q7) Which steps of the cooperation protocol are not beneﬁcial to the executing entity?
The answer to this question is determined by the valuation of the entities (Q4) and the coop-
eration protocol (Q6). The engineer focusses on inﬂuencing behavior regarding detrimental
protocol steps.
• (Q8) Is behavior perceptible? If yes, how costly and reliable is such perception? It is clear
that a rational entity only exhibits cooperative behavior if other entities are able to perceive
such cooperativeness.
Adjustment. Before turning to the incentive scheme, the engineer has to consider whether the
protocol should be adjusted. Such adjustment aims at ameliorating the protocol’s properties with
respect to the subsequent application of an incentive scheme. More speciﬁcally, the necessity of
detrimental protocol steps (Q7) should be revisited. Ideally, the cooperation protocol remains
eﬀective even if such protocol steps are not executed. Furthermore, the protocol should be
extended by mechanisms that make behavior more perceptible (Q8).
The engineer may choose among several perception mechanisms. If digital signatures are ap-
pended to protocol messages, the receiver of a message is able to verify the authenticity of the
sender and to check whether the entities of the forwarding path altered the message. Redundancy
enhances the perceptibility of speciﬁc protocol steps. For example, the cooperation protocol could
be extended in order to accommodate the issuance of receipts. If a receipt is a non-repudiable
evidence [1], it may be transferred to other entities. Consequently, these entities are able to
perceive the behavior that is described by the receipt. A cost-eﬀective perception mechanism is
overhearing. Under certain conditions, an overhearing entity perceives which packets or messages
are sent by other entities. However, the eﬀectiveness of overhearing is diﬃcult to assess. Due to
physical or topological restrictions, the overhearing entity might not receive the same transmis-
sions or messages as the intended receiver. Probing is based on the idea that an entity behaves
similarly under certain conditions. Therefore, it suﬃces to perceive only parts of the behavior in
order to conjecture which behavior is typically exhibited. Probing is attractive for behavior that
is costly to perceive.
4.2 The Choice of Appropriate Incentives
Based on the analysis and adjustment of the cooperation protocol, the engineer has to choose
incentives that eﬀectively stimulate cooperative behavior. The deﬁnition of commitments sets
the scope of the respective incentive mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms provide incentives
for entering into commitments, whereas others provide incentives for adhering to them.
Deﬁnition of commitments. A major design decision for incentive schemes consists of de-
termining which type of behavior should be remunerated and which type should be taken as
granted. Only misbehavior regarding the latter type has to be punished since, for the ﬁrst type
of behavior, the absence of remuneration constitutes a disincentive for misbehavior. Based on the
commitment-centric cooperation model, it seems promising to remunerate if an entity commits
to speciﬁc behavior. Accordingly, failure to adhere to such a commitment should be punished.
For this purpose, it has to be determined how a defecting entity is treated.
The two extremes of deﬁning commitments are as follows:
1. Participation in the system is the only commitment. This means that, upon participation,
each entity has to adhere to the predeﬁned protocols and transactions. This extreme ﬁts
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best to cooperation protocols that require unconditional cooperativeness in order to be
eﬀective. For example, for some topologies on the network layer, the cooperativeness of
routing bottlenecks is necessary in order to avert partitioning.
2. Each transaction is separately committed to. In this regard, a rational entity only partici-
pates in beneﬁcial transactions. This extreme is suitable if cooperation can be decomposed
into transactions, as it is true on the application layer.
The ﬁrst extreme allows for rather simple incentive schemes. However, the incentive compati-
bility of adhering to the own commitment is diﬃcult to achieve. This is especially true if behavior
is not perceptible. Then, the lack of adherence cannot be identiﬁed and punished. Consequently,
imperceptible behavior should be exempted from commitments.
The deﬁnition of commitments itself has to comply with the demand for incentive compati-
bility and conﬁgurability. Otherwise, the entities will agree on collectively altering the proposed
deﬁnition of commitments. Conﬁgurable commitments provide a means of considering the het-
erogeneous preferences of the entities.
Incentives for entering into commitments. In our previous work [3], we have proposed
incentive patterns as a means of rendering transactions mutually beneﬁcial. This is necessary if
a transaction appears to be beneﬁcial only for some of the concerned entities. In such a case,
the incentive patterns provide a means of convincing the remaining entities of the beneﬁts of the
transaction. These patterns can be generalized by basing them on the notion of commitments.
This means that an incentive pattern induces that an entity enters into a otherwise detrimental
commitment. The incentive patterns and their most important properties are summarized in
Table 1. It provides a sound foundation for the choice of appropriate incentives that remunerate
for commitments. For each type of commitment, one or several incentive patterns may be applied.
Basically, incentive patterns fall into two classes: On the one hand, an entity may believe
that its peers will reciprocate by entering into future commitments. This approach is based
on trust and is applied by the collective pattern and community pattern. On the other hand,
an entity is convinced to enter into a commitment if its peers enter into commitments that are
beneﬁcial for itself. Such a trade based approach is applied by the barter trade pattern and
the bond based incentive patterns. For the barter trade, the temporal scope of the respective
commitments coincides. Hence, the committing entities assume symmetric roles. In contrast, a
bond is a commitment regarding behavior at some future point in time. The most relevant type
of bonds are notes. A note contains a commitment of its issuer.
Incentives for adhering to commitments. Bilateral or multilateral commitments often refer
to the mutual provision of services. From an abstract point of view, such mutual provision
of services represents an exchange of items. Exchanges are processed according to exchange
protocols [13]. They typically assert a weaker notion of atomicity. More speciﬁcally, an entity
has to hand over its own item in order to acquire the desired item of its peer. This means that
an entity has to adhere to its commitments if it wants that the other entities adhere to theirs,
too. Such coupling provides an incentive for adhering to one’s own commitments. However, the
considerable overhead of exchange protocols has to be matched by the value of the items that are
exchanged. For the repeated exchange of items, the sliding window mechanism is a promising
exchange protocol. It limits the number of outstanding items. This means the entities’ balance
of delivered items is coupled.
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Table 1: Overview of incentive patterns and their properties
highsmallmediumsmallOverhead
o+-- -Scalability
o+-
noneEnforcement of 
remuneration
Type of remuneration
Barter trade 
pattern
Bond based pattern 
(eg.: note pattern)
Community 
pattern
Collective 
pattern
noteservice in returnreputation
asymmetricsymmetricasymmetricRoles
Trade basedTrust based Incentive pattern
Properties
If exchange protocols are not viable, there exists another means of inducing the adherence
to commitments, namely Distributed reputation systems. They keep track which entities adhere
to their commitments and which do not [1]. In contrast to exchange protocols, an entity is able
to defect by refraining from adhering to the own commitment while the peers adhere to theirs.
However, the betrayed peers may disseminate their view of the defector to other entities so that
other entities are aware of the defection. As a result of such awareness, other entities (and the
defected peers) may refrain from entering into commitments with the defector or they may refuse
to adhere to their outstanding commitments. Such punishment provides an incentive for adhering
to one’s own commitments. The choice of the distributed reputation system is contingent upon the
characteristics of the considered cooperation protocol. On the one hand, distributed reputation
systems make diﬀering assumptions regarding identities, encryption, and overhearing. On the
other hand, they ﬁnd diﬀerent tradeoﬀs between the beneﬁts and costs that arise from operating
them.
Furthermore, in heterogeneous application environments, the engineer has to choose a repu-
tation system that leaves room for conﬁgurability with respect to the quality and costs of the
trust domain, trust contexts, and trust assessment.
4.3 Evaluation
After the design of the incentive scheme, the engineer has to evaluate her work. In general,
simulations provide the only cost-eﬃcient means for such evaluation. In the following, we discuss
the degrees of freedom with respect to the realization of such simulations.
Objective of the evaluation. Evaluations of existing incentive schemes [5, 9] are focussed
on the total utility of the participating entities. In addition, we propose to evaluate the fairness
of the incentive scheme with respect to the individual utility/costs that arise from cooperation.
High degrees of fairness indicate that entities have to exhibit cooperative behavior in order to
beneﬁt from the behavior of other entities.
Benchmarks. The original cooperation protocol represents a benchmark for evaluating the
eﬃciency of the incentive scheme. A further benchmark is a system in which a central authority
is able to ensure that entities adhere to their commitments. Such benchmark indicates the
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eﬀectiveness of the incentive scheme since the goal of incentive schemes is to approximate the
eﬀectiveness of such central enforcement.
Modelling the entities’ behavior. The entities’ behavior regarding the cooperation protocol
has to be modelled appropriately in order to obtain meaningful simulation results. The conven-
tional approach to such modelling consists of assigning strategies to each entity. For stateless
strategies, the model deﬁnes the probability of exhibiting speciﬁc behavior. For example, accord-
ing to such an approach, altruistic entities are modelled as entities that adhere to 100% of their
commitments. Stateful strategies are based on the trust mechanisms of the distributed reputation
system and, thus, consider the past behavior of other entities.
A sounder approach of modelling behavior consists of applying a utility/cost model for each
entity. The model can be derived from the analysis of question (Q4). Such modelling is complex
since the eﬀects of the incentive schemes have to be modelled, too. For instance, the model has
to include the entities’ perception of the eﬀectiveness of the incentive scheme. It is needed for
the calculation of opportunity costs that arise from misbehavior.
Setting the simulation parameters. The aforementioned behavioral models are parameter-
izable and, thus, provide for some of the simulation parameters. The second type of simulation
parameters may be derived from the incentive scheme if it is conﬁgurable. Such conﬁgurability is
needed for ﬁnding entity-dependent tradeoﬀs between the overhead and beneﬁts of the incentive
mechanisms. Finally, the speciﬁcs of the cooperation environment constitute the third type of
simulation parameters. For example, the number of cooperations that occur during the simulated
time is such a parameter.
The simulation parameters do not have to be static throughout the simulation run. The
simulation may as well be organized in rounds that are parameterized separately. For example, the
simulation methodology of evolutionary game theory [14] may be included if the parameterization
of the behavioral models depends on the outcome of previous rounds.
Deﬁning the measurement categories and deriving the key quantities. According to
the objectives of the evaluation, the engineer has to measure the total utility u and the total costs
c that arise from cooperation. If the objectives of the evaluation include fairness, the individual
utility ui and individual costs ci have to be measured separately for every entity. Based on these
measurement categories, several key quantities have to be derived in order to be able to interpret
the simulation results. The ratio uc indicates the eﬃciency of the cooperation protocol. It is
applicable even if the utility and the costs are measured in diﬀerent units. The coeﬃcient of
correlation between the (ui, ci) pairs is called the fairness coeﬃcient. A straightforward means
of correlation is the calculation of a regression line between the individual utilities and costs. In
case of good linear correlation, the slope of the regression line indicates the magnitude of the
incentive eﬀects.
Performing series of measurement. For the evaluation, measurements are required for var-
ious parameterizations. In the following, we highlight the series of measurement that make most
sense.
• Conﬁguration of the incentive scheme versus the entities’ behavior: For every
type of entity population, it is tested which conﬁguration of the incentive scheme is most
appropriate. Such tests may be based on the eﬃciency of the cooperation protocol or on its
7
Se
rv
ic
e
 a
nn
o
u
n
ce
m
e
n
t
Service search
any
cast
any
cast
Figure 1: The Lanes service discovery overlay
fairness. For the respective parameterizations, the simulation results should be compared
to those of the benchmarks in order to estimate the levels of eﬃciency and fairness.
• Conﬁguration of the incentive scheme versus the cooperation environment: This
test varies the parameters of the cooperation environment, e.g., the number of cooperations.
5 A Case Study: Lanes
In this section, the procedure of engineering incentive schemes is exempliﬁed for a service discovery
overlay.
5.1 The Lanes Protocol
A service-oriented architecture is a suitable model for application level resource sharing in ad hoc
networks. Here, devices can enhance their functionality by using services oﬀered by other devices.
For instance, a device might oﬀer the download of certain ﬁles, computation or communication
capabilities. Because of the lack of infrastructure in ad hoc networks, decentralized service trading
becomes necessary.
The Lanes [15] approach provides such a cooperation protocol for the announcement and
search of services. The Lanes overlay is shown for three lanes in Figure 1. Services are announced
along a lane across the proactive vertical overlay links, whereas services are searched via anycast
across several lanes.
Analysis. Let us consider the questions introduced in Section 4.1. We answer the questions
as follows: (Q1: Entities considered) Discovery protocol entities [2] and application protocol
entities. (Q2: Rational vs. Temper Resistant) Rational. Since any device may participate in
the ad hoc network, we cannot presume tamper resistant hardware. (Q3: Identiﬁable Entities)
Each entity has a non-alterable identity that is certiﬁed together with its public key and is
assigned during the bootstrapping of the device. Digital signatures provide a means of reliable
authentication. (Q4/5: Valuation) The utility that arises from cooperation consists of ﬁnding
services on other devices. The costs ensue from communicating over the network, hoarding
service announcements, and processing the cooperation protocol2. Due to the limited capabilities
of the devices and the frequency of overlay operations, the entities generally prefer eﬃciency over
security. (Q6: Kinds of Cooperation) The Lanes protocol is composed of ﬁve sub-protocols, i.e.,
2We refrain from analyzing the entities’ valuation of these costs since we will choose a strategic behavioral model
for the evaluation.
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service announcement, service request, overlay login, intra-lane and inter-lane maintenance. (Q7:
Non-Beneﬁcial Steps) Processing and (unaltered) sending of service announcements, searches and
maintenance messages are all non-beneﬁcial under certain circumstances. (Q8: Perceptibility)
Behavior regarding the overlay maintenance can only be perceived by some of the immediate
neighbors. In addition, parts of the behavior for the announcement and search of services is not
perceptible at all.
Adjustment. Lanes is conceived as an eﬃcient service discovery overlay. Therefore, the com-
plete protocol (including the non-beneﬁcial protocol steps) is necessary for the eﬀectiveness of
the service discovery. Due to the imperceptibility of most behavior, several perception mecha-
nisms have to be applied. We introduce redundancy by double linking overlay nodes. Further
redundancy is added by promoting the uppermost entity of a lane to the coordinator of mainte-
nance decisions. Furthermore, the sub-protocols that involve several entities are extended with
the transmission of receipts. Finally, digital signatures are appended to those messages that are
likely to be altered by misbehaving entities.
The adjustment of the protocol cannot cope with the imperceptibility of some protocol steps
of the service announcement and search protocol. For instance, a rational entity is still able to
return negative results for service searches without actually processing them.
5.2 The Choice of Appropriate Incentives
Deﬁnition of Commitments. If participation in the overlay was the only commitment, the
design of the incentive scheme would become simple. However, in such a case, the imperceptible
parts of the service announcement/search protocols are not executed. Therefore, participation in
service announcements and searches should be separately committed to.
In order to log into a lane, a newcomer commits to comply with the remaining sub-protocols.
This means that each lane member has to participate in the maintenance protocols. Failure to do
so is interpreted as defection from one’s own commitment. With respect to conﬁgurability, the
terms of such commitment may diﬀer. Hence, laptops aim at participating in a secure lane that
provides a larger set of services. On the other hand, PDAs choose eﬃcient lanes that are similar
to the original protocols. In this regard, truth telling during the login leads to an incentive
compatible partitioning into rather homogeneous lanes. Entities that do not adhere to their
commitments are treated as outlaws. This means that the other entities opt to exclude them
from the overlay. Such step is executed locally within a lane.
Incentives for entering into commitments. For logging in a new entity into the overlay,
both the newcomer and the remaining entities have to commit to participate in the maintenance
protocol. Therefore, the barter trade pattern provides appropriate incentives for this type of
commitment.
The second type of commitment refers to answering a service search of an other entity. For
this purpose, we have to choose an incentive pattern that supports asymmetric roles. According
to Table 1, the note pattern appears most appropriate. This is because the note pattern provides
better enforcement of remuneration than the community pattern. Such enforcement is needed
since the costs of processing service searches are considerable. Since we apply the note pattern,
the issuer of a service search has to hand over a note to the entity that ﬁnds a matching service.
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Incentives for adhering to commitments. Conventional exchange protocols are too expen-
sive for the operation of the maintenance protocols. However, the sliding window mechanism
could be applied in order to limit the number of outstanding notes. This means that every entity
is only willing to accept a certain number of notes from other entities. The size of such note credit
corresponds to the window size of the sliding window mechanism. If the note credit is reached,
the bearer of the notes refrains from processing service searches of the notes’ issuer.
The lack of exchange protocols demands for the application of a distributed reputation system.
We apply the Buddy System [16] since it provides for contextualized trust despite of its relatively
low overhead.
5.3 Evaluation
In the following discussion of the evaluation, we will refer to the combination of the adjusted
Lanes protocol and the incentive scheme as the S-Lanes protocol.
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Figure 4: The evaluation of the fairness and incentive eﬀects
The objective of the evaluation is to assess the eﬃciency and fairness of the S-Lanes protocol.
For the behavioral modelling, we apply the strategic model because of its convenience. More
speciﬁcally, we distinguish between three types of entities. Altruists always cooperate, whereas
uncooperative entities never cooperate. Cooperative entities only cooperate with those entities
that have exhibited cooperative behavior towards themselves before. The behavior is further pa-
rameterized by the note credit that an entity accords to other entities. Apart from the behavioral
modelling, the simulation parameters consist of the type of cooperation protocol (Lanes versus
S-Lanes) and the cooperation environment. In this regard, the Lanes protocol acts as benchmark.
The system consists of 20 devices that participate in the service discovery overlay. Each of them
provides a unique service and looks for services in an uniformly distributed manner. The co-
operation environment is parameterized by the number of service searches that are initiated by
each entity. The measurement categories consist of the number of found services (utility) and the
number of sent messages or matching operations3 (costs).
The series of measurement have been conducted with DIANEmu [17]. The ﬁrst measurement
considers the total utility and the total costs. It is parameterized by the type of participating
entities. The number of total searches and note credits is ﬁxed at 4400 and 10 respectively. In
Figure 2, the simulation results are illustrated. Interestingly, the total utility and costs of the
S-Lanes protocol are considerably lower than those of the Lanes protocol if most entities are unco-
operative. This is because the cooperative entities perceive the misbehavior of the uncooperative
entities and refrain from cooperating with them any more.
Figure 3 shows the individual utilities and costs4 of 15 cooperative entities and 5 uncooperative
entities. The uncooperative entities are able to proﬁt from cooperation in the Lanes protocol as
much as the cooperative entities. However, they do so with a minimum of costs. Therefore, the
3A matching operation processes an incoming service search by testing whether it matches one of the hoarded
service advertisements.
4For clarity reasons, the costs only refer to the number of matching operations.
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Lanes protocol is not fair. In contrast, uncooperative entities proﬁt much less from cooperation
in the S-Lanes protocol than cooperative entities do. As a result, the respective utility/cost-pairs
correlate well with the regression line. The correlation coeﬃcient is 0.69. The slope b of the
regression line is 0.54. This means that an entity has to perform approximately two matching
operations in order to ﬁnd a service.
We have evaluated the fairness of S-Lanes for diﬀerent parameterizations. The results are
shown in Figure 4. Each line of the ﬁgure varies a parameter, i.e., the note credit, the entity
types, and the number of total searches. According to the ﬁgure, individual utilities and costs
do not correlate for the Lanes protocol. For some parameterizations, they are even negatively
correlated since the individual utility of uncooperative entities is even higher than the individual
utility of cooperative ones. The simulation results clearly demonstrate that the S-Lanes protocol
complies with the demand for fairness. According to the results, the more searches are conducted
and the tighter the note credit is, the higher the fairness coeﬃcient and the incentive eﬀect is.
The slope values higher than 1 indicate superlinear eﬀects of cooperative behavior.
6 Conclusion
In ad hoc networks, devices have to cooperate in order to compensate for the absence of in-
frastructure. Incentive schemes have been proposed as a means of fostering cooperation among
self-interested devices. However, it is diﬃcult to conceive an eﬀective and eﬃcient incentive
scheme for a given cooperation protocol. Therefore, in this paper, we have proposed a systematic
approach for the engineering of incentive schemes. For this purpose, we suggested a procedure
for the design of incentive schemes. It comprises the analysis and adjustment of the cooperation
protocol, the choice of appropriate incentives for cooperation, and guidelines for evaluation of the
incentive scheme. The procedure has been exempliﬁed for the Lanes protocol. The design and
evaluation of an incentive scheme for this cooperation protocol is performed according to the steps
of the proposed procedure. The simulation results have shown that the engineered cooperation
protocol S-Lanes complies with the demand for fairness.
In the future, we aim at engineering incentive schemes for other service discovery overlays and
for application layer cooperation protocols. In addition, we will survey existing exchange protocols
and distributed reputation systems with respect to their applicability in ad hoc networks. This will
provide more guidance for the choice of appropriate incentives for the adherence to commitments.
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